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BOOK REVIEW
LOWERING ONE'S CITES: A (SORT OF) REVIEW OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MANUAL OF LEGAL CITATION1
Mary L Coombs'
Traditionally, law review articles have grappled with the substance of the
law, embodied in the texts of either judicial opinions or other law review
articles. More recently, serious attention occasionally has been paid to mat-
ters that might once have seemed peripheral-the style in which ideas are
expressed (or hidden) and the marginalia of prior writings. In particular,
footnotes, once considered beneath contempt, have been raised into the
prominence of text3 (though some of the old school may enumerate the trend
as one of descending to the lowest common denominator4).
I Cf. Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 44 (1936) (noting, after
excoriating law review style, that
[w]hen it comes to the book reviews, company manners are not so strictly enforced and
it is occasionally possible to talk out loud or crack a joke. As a result, the book reviews
are stuck away in the back lke country cousins and anyone who wants to take off his
shoes and feel at home in a law review will do well to come in by way of the kitchen.).
2 Professor of Law, University of Miami. J.D. University of Michigan, 1978. I want to
thank the many friends-most of whom no doubt wish to remain anonymous-whose wit
and/or wisdom contributed to the development of this Review. The occasional politics of the
(usually) first footnote-to advance the author's plans to stay at (or move from) her present
institution-are thus necessarily absent from this footnote. (A cf., e.g., citation here to any
particular source at note 1 would be contrary to decency and self-preservation.) Such issues
are, furthermore, beyond (or before) the scope of this Book Review. See generally Austin,
Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1131, 1145-47 (1987) (briefly
describing use of first footnotes to indicate those with whom one wishes to be associated);
Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435, 442 & n.19 (1987) (citing
authors who have poked fun at footnote 1).
I also want to recognize my student editor, who can decide for herself if she wishes to
remain anonymous. No one privy to our discussions of the minutiae of, for example, when a
space is required in a citation, would believe that both of us find the whole process to be a
bureaucrat's variant of theater of the absurd.
3 Really should see Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 275 (1989) (a deconstruction of
footnotes and especially of footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938), in the form of an extended footnote four). This and other unconventional signals are
explained at the end of this Book Review. Trust me.
4 Footnotes may be low, but they are frequently not least. See, sort of, Ellman, A
Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J. Legal Educ. 681, 688
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The shift in emphasis to form and fringe is not restricted to a single field
but obtains in most academic disciplines. In particular, I suggest, there has
been a general revolution in which commentary has become subject matter
and footnote has become text. The intellectual banner under which this
revolution has been fought is deconstruction, a movement that insists that
the gaps and corners and slippages in texts-the words not chosen-are as
important to its meaning as the "central ideas" studied in traditional forms
of interpretation. The guerilla leading this revolution has been Jacques Der-
rida.' The ideas of Derrida or, perhaps more precisely, the Idea of Derrida,
has begun to influence legal writing.'
The contents--or at least the existence-of footnotes in legal writing has
been a topic of marginal interest for some time. A tradition of sniping at the
overwritten, over-footnoted style of legal writing can be traced back at least
as far as the Legal Realists,7 and has continued to this day.8 Tenured profes-
sors and judges have attacked this manner of legal writing directly, while
Table 4 (1983) (ranking faculty productivity at different law schools, inter alia, by the total
number of footnotes in articles they had published in leading law reviews during the sample
period).
The most heavily footnoted article I had seen before preparing this footnote was Choper,
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1984) (1611 footnotes). Choper, however, was apparently a mere temporary
interloper. Earlier that year, Arnold Jacobs had published The Meaning of "Security" Under
Rule 10b-5, 29 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 211 (1984), with 1247 footnotes. Jacobs easily regained
the title after the Choper challenge with An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 209 (1987) (4824 footnotes).
The various pieces comprising Harvard Developments in the Law may also be in the
running for this dubious honor. The total number of footnotes in these collections, however,
cannot be determined by simply turning to the last page of the Development, since each major
section is separately footnoted. Thus, for example, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1427 (1978) contains (88 + 143 + 183 + 264 + 113 + 77 + 207 + 395)
1470 footnotes. A Uniform System of Citation (14th ed. 1986) [hereinafter Bluebook (or
Bluebook followed by the edition number, if other than the 14th ed.)], another Harvard Law
Review Association product, is confusing in its solution to the conundrum of how to cross-
reference to the text at a particular numbered footnote in a source that has several, for
example, n. 17's. See Bluebook, supra, at 21 (Rule 3.6). This rule, prescribing how to provide
cross-references, seems to assume that a reference to "text accompanying note 17" would be
clear. The Harvard Developments, however, could logically contain a footnote that said: "See
infra text accompanying note 17. But see supra text accompanying note 17."
5 Pretend to have seen randomly, e.g., J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (1976); Derrida,
Limited Inc abc .... 2 Glyph 162 (1977). See infra p. 1109 on meaning of the signals "pretend
to have seen" and "randomly."
6 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 3.
7 A classic is Rodell, supra note 1.
8 E.g., Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 Va. L. Rev. 279 (1962); Mikva,
Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 647 (1985); Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1343 (1986). [Note to editors: please do not rearrange this chronological list,
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embodying an almost footnote-free "purity." 9 In contrast, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review guerrillas-in-training have twice attacked with
the weapon of heavy-handed (or heavy-footed) irony.1"
The content of footnotes and the issue of whether certain material should
be in text or in footnote has also been the basis for innumerable unpublicized
battles. 1 Some of these have been substantive; others, at least partly formal,
were fought with the Bluebook as a weapon.12 Authors unwilling to follow
its dictates traditionally had no counter-weapons but the force of their intel-
lect, a somewhat inept sword for battling over such issues as the correct
a.k.a The Long Goodbye, in accordance with the dictates of the Bluebook, supra note 4, at 12
(Rule 2.4(h)). See Posner, supra, at 1347.]
The bad repute of law review writing is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the admission of
one of its few defenders that the bad writing of law reviews "rarely renders the articles
impossible to decipher." Martin, The Law Review Citadel: Rodell Revisited, 71 Iowa L. Rev.
1093, 1098 (1986).
9 Rodell avoided footnotes entirely in his first article. See Rodell, supra note 1. The second
had only the by-then-obligatory asterisk footnote to identify and credential the author. It also
proudly announced the author's near-perfect record at avoiding the pesky critters in the rest of
his works. Rodell, supra note 8, at 287. (Thus, Rodell's articles, in striking contrast to most
law review writing, may well be little noted, but long remembered.) Judge Mikva, supra note
8, has that first asterisk footnote plus an ironic, sole, and final "n.4" (see, of course, United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)). Judge Posner, supra note 8, has seven
footnotes in addition to the introdiectory one-a decline from the absolutist rigor of his
predecessors but, at a rate of less than one per page, far below the average for law review
writing. Ellman, supra note 4, at 683, calculates the average number of footnotes per page in
his sample of leading law reviews to range from 2.9 to 4.3. While this data might well confirm
Rodell's curmudgeonliness, EUman suggests that the total number of footnotes published in
such law reviews is the best objective measure of scholarly rank. Id. at 689.
10 Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1474 (1975)
[hereinafter Don't Fly]; Aside, Don't Cry Over Filled Milk: The Neglected Footnote Three to
Carolene Products, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553 (1988) [hereinafter Don't Cry].
Although The University of Pennsylvania Law Review is a co-copyright holder in the
Bluebook, it is Harvard Law Review with which it is inevitably associated. Perhaps, then, it is
natural that such guerrilla attacks on the Bluebook should appear at Harvard only in what the
Harvard Law Review might consider a subordinate journal. See Strasser, Technical Due
Process: ? (Book Review), 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 507 (1977) (reviewing Bluebook (12th
ed. 1976)). But cf. Book Note, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1323 (1988) (reviewing The University of
Chicago Manual of Legal Citation).
II Some choice fragments end up neither in text nor footnote but wait, like orphaned
children, in their parents' word processor, for another article to adopt them.
12 Prior to the introduction of the Maroon Book, see infra note 18, the Bluebook clearly
reigned supreme. It "has been called the 'pioneer' manual, the 'Bible,' the 'final arbiter,' even
the 'Kama Sutra' of legal citation." Cooper, Anglo-American Legal Citation: Historical
Development and Library Implications, 75 L. Libr. J. 3, 21 (1982) (footnotes omitted: if you
are compulsive enough to care, look it up).
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parenthetical or introductory signal.13 Thus, most law review authors,
whatever their private moans and protests, rarely made an issue of such for-
malities.14 Rather, like sheep, they were controlled by the student editors
who had deigned to publish their work.15 They, in turn, deferred to the
other student editors who had invented the Bluebook1 6 and are the current
guardians of its Pythian flame. Particularly stubborn folks could engage in
the game of academic chicken available to both author and review staff in
the latter stages of the publication process, but applying this to the Bluebook
13 Perhaps my favorite story of this sort involves my colleague, Richard Michael Fischl. In
his article, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 789 (1989), as accepted by the Review, he
had said: "[W]hatever the case with Holmes's dog, employees would prefer to be neither
kicked nor tripped over." Id. at 803-04 n.41. Whatever has been achieved in the way of a
common law, we apparently lack a common vocabulary; the reference to Holmes's dog, the
editors asserted, must be spelled out. Professor Fischl did so, but, in the next draft, he
included an author's revenge: "See 0. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881)." Id. Don't you
wish you could see prior drafts of id. ("discussing late nineteenth century pet care practices").
The editors, presumably in jest, asked if this was an accurate reading of Holmes's meaning;
they were not so anal-retentive as to require a parenthetical indicating that "tripped over" had
been substituted for Holmes's "stumbled over."
See also your own "additional source material that supports the proposition," starring the
intransigent, stubborn, obstreperous author/editor of your choice.
14 Experienced law professors have learned the art of negotiating with editors and cite-
checkers. They will yield reluctantly on issues of no real significance, see infra note 25, in
order to keep the arguments or phraseology they really care about, see infra note 32
(unchanged from prior drafts). The excessively clever may even include deliberate errors to
provide cite-checkers with an easy sense of accomplishment.
15 Law school hiring practices ensure that many faculty themselves served time as law
review editors. Submitting to the dictates of the current crop of editors may be felt as a
validation of our own pasts rather than as a form of poetic(?) justice(?). Cf. Austin, Footnote
Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. - (forthcoming 1990) (describing
process by which law review editors are acculturated into footnote-philia). (The working cite
to this article was "some issue of the Miami L. Rev. that my students had better get into page
proofs soon. Cf. infra note 57 (on citing colleagues' working drafts).)
16 Bluebook, supra note 4 (1st ed. 1926). This edition, only 30 pages long, was relatively
simple in its directives. The editors of the fourteenth edition have suggested that citation
manuals, like other bureaucratic products, may inevitably metastasize. Comments of
Christina Uhlrick at panel on proper citation form at National Conference of Law Reviews
(University of Toledo, 1989) [hereinafter Law Review Conference] (tape available from author,
but see infra note 57 and accompanying text).
Given the length of the Bluebook, one is surprised to find a gap in its prescriptions. Yet the
correct citation form for a book like the Bluebook, lacking listed author or editor, is unclear.
See Bluebook, supra, at 84 (Rule 15.1: "If a work has no named editor, it may be necessary to
designate an edition by the name of the publisher) (emphasis added). Pretend to have cf.'ed
Godel's theorem, discussed in, e.g., D. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden
Braid (1979) (describing Godel's theorem, which shows that complex mathematical systems
can never be both self-contained and complete).
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issues of citation form seems rather like hunting gnats with an elephant
gun.
17
Recently, however, the battlefield has been altered by the publication of a
new competitor, The University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation."8
The determination by University of Chicago students to compete, and
thereby allow the market to decide which is the more efficient guide to legal
citation, seems entirely apt,19 as does the cooperation with the profit-making
sector indicated by the choice of publishers.2 ° The differences in substance
between the two enterprises are also striking.
Richard Posner, in his laudatory essay introducing the Maroon Book,2
summed up quite accurately the basic differences between the two manuals.
17 See, sort of, metaphor in preceding paragraph; see also, sort of, for similarly mixed
metaphor of shotgun type attacks on the law review merry-go-round, Rodell, supra note 8, at
287 (followed by the unapologetic: "As a metaphor-mixer from way back, I remind you that
the merry-go-round is handy by the shooting gallery. .... ").
18 The University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation (U. Chi. L. Rev. & U. Chi. Legal F.
eds. 1989) [hereinafter Maroon Book; the temptation to be less color-precise and refer to it as
the University of Chicago's "Little Red Book" is almost, but not quite, overwhelming].
19 The Bluebook has been called a monopoly. Given the role of its law review authors in
determining citation form within their own pages, it might be viewed more accurately as the
product of a cartel. The difference is significant. For example, at first the Bluebook imposed
its authors' will absolutely regarding type faces. Bluebook, supra note 4, at 97-98 (11th. ed.
1967). As law reviews began to defect, the Bluebook softened its stand. Large and small
capitals were "generally used," but it reluctantly acknowledged that, "[i]f a publication has
decided not to use that typeface, ordinary roman type should be used in its place." Bluebook,
supra note 4, at I (12th ed. 1976). By now, the Bluebook authors have given up. They provide
three options, noting that "[l]aw reviews use various typeface conventions." Bluebook, supra
note 4, at 5. Cf., for the hell of it, e.g. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1,
27 (1984) (on the instability of cartels). Others have noted the aptness of antitrust metaphors
for legal forms. Austin, supra note 2.
The Maroon Book has opted for prescriptive simplicity: "[a]ll material should appear in
roman type" except when italicizing case names and book and article titles. Maroon Book,
supra note 18, at 9. The Maroon Book also explicitly authorizes authors to use italics for
"words to be emphasized." Id. That such authorization was felt necessary may suggest the
constricting power of citation manuals.
20 The Maroon Book is published by Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Bancroft-
Whitney Company and Mead Data Central, Inc., Maroon Book, supra note 18, at 1; the
Bluebook is published by the Harvard Law Review Association, Bluebook, supra note 4, at ii.
21 Posner, supra note 8. Posner praises the Maroon Book, inter alia, for calling on authors
to include the first names of cited authors, since this may help the reader decide "how much
weight he wants to give the citation." Id. at 1345. Such information is only relevant in a
middle range, however. It is of no value to the thoroughly ignorant (except to indicate
(usually) gender) and unnecessary to the cognoscenti. Would Judge Posner otherwise be
unsure whether a particular title was by Ronald or Andrea Dworkin? Joe Singer's solidarity-
based rationale for providing full names strikes me as more persuasive than Judge Posner's
informational market argument. [Joseph William] Singer, Persuasion, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2442,
2442 n.* (1989).
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The Bluebook is highly particularistic, formalistic, and prescriptive; to the
extent possible, rules are given for every conceivable citation problem."2 The
mass of particular rules, however, has made the Bluebook so lengthy and
complex, that its own purpose-helping both writer and reader-has been
defeated." The Maroon Book, by contrast, is far more open-ended (and,
perhaps as important, far shorter). It suggests rather than orders, and it
leaves many decisions up to the author, depending on the particular needs of
the text.24
The contrast between the Bluebook and Maroon Book recapitulates a ten-
sion existing throughout law: that between rules and standards. 25 Interest-
ingly, it is the Harvard-led manual that opts for rules.26 Indeed, its
prescriptive character has apparently increased at the same time that
22 No citation is really necessary here; even if I'm not certifiably reliable, the statement
already carries the legitimacy of a pronouncement by Judge Posner. Nonetheless, those who
value what Fred Rodell, supra note 1, at 40, called the "probative or if-you're-from-Missouri-
just-take-a-look-at-all-this type" footnote, may accord, e.g., Benton, Developments in the
Law-Legal Citation (Book Review), 86 Yale L.J. 197 (1976) (reviewing twelfth edition of the
Bluebook); Lushing, Book Review, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 599 (1967) (reviewing eleventh edition
of the Bluebook).
2 A guide to the Bluebook, repeating its admonitions in somewhat simpler language, is
available. M. Ray & J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: Getting it Right and Getting it Written
(1987).
24 The only review of the Maroon Book in a disinterested law review suggests that its
radical surgery may go too far. Cornwell, Book Review, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 233 (1987).
The value of that review is called somewhat into question by its criticism of the Maroon Book
for including the suggestions on style in Posner, supra note 8. If this is a problem, it is readily
avoided by purchasing the pamphlet rather than, as proposed in the review, being more "cost-
efficient" and photocopying the version in the Chicago Law Review.
The Maroon Book was also subject to a review in the Harvard Law Review. Book Note,
supra note 10. The review is, on the whole, unfavorable, but the editors are discreet: there is
no indication in the table of contents pages that the book is being reviewed, apparently
avoiding the notice of the Index of Legal Periodicals. Will not see in, e.g., 27 Index to Legal
Periodicals (1988).
25 See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685 (1976) [hereinafter Form and Substance]. Contra Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984) (renouncing fundamental contradiction at heart of
Form and Substance, supra).
See, for the hell of it, Dalton, supra note 2, at 444-45 (discussing appropriateness of white
intellectual's appropriation of Chuck Berry's lyrics). But see [this is all the word association
games the editors will let me get away with].
Note: at this juncture, the book review editor and I disagreed vehemently over whether the
proper introductory signal to Gabel & Kennedy, supra, was "contra" or "but see." Neither of
us could articulate clearly the difference between the two. The editor prevailed.
26 Cf. Strasser, supra note 10, at 509 (criticizing twelfth edition for exalting technical over
substantive due process). The Maroon Book's approach is readily explicable with a different
analogy. The editors have replaced per se rules with a generalized rule of reason. Cf. R.
Posner, Antitrust Law 165-66 (1976) (advocating such change in regard to distribution
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Harvard faculty have been in the forefront of attacks on formalism.2 7 The
gracious suggestion that "[w]henever clarity will be served, the citation form
should be altered without hesitation," was deleted in the eleventh edition28
29and never seen again.
The Chicago manual is far more permissive. "[B]ecause it is neither possi-
ble nor desirable to write a particular rule for every sort of citation problem
that might arise, the rules leave a fair amount of discretion to practitioners,
authors, and editors."' The rules/standards debate, however, is much more
complex than a simple battle of left against right. As certain minority critics
of the Critical Legal Studies movement have forcefully pointed out, formal
rules can sometimes provide a bulwark to protect the interests of minorities
and other dispossessed groups. By contrast, a legal regime without any
absolute rules can be manipulated more easily by people with power.31 The
discretion provided by the Maroon Book will no doubt be exercised by Judge
Posner in any of his published works. It is unlikely to benefit the poor
schlemiel from some second-ranked law school whose submission is being
edited by the student editors of the Chicago Law Review. 2
A comparison of these citation manuals provides an occasion, or at least
an excuse, for considering the meaning and value of one element of legal
writing that has remained almost unexamined in the august (or, in some
cases, mayan or julian) pages of law reviews: the format of the footnote. In
particular, I want to consider those pesky little signals at the beginning of
most footnotes.3 3
Whether the purposes of signals are better served by the complex of rules
in the Bluebook or the looser style of the Maroon Book depends on what
those purposes are. The traditional understandings of the "legal citation"
are that its purpose is "to lead its reader to the work cited" 34 or "to give
credit for borrowed material [and] to provide the reader with access to
agreements). Since I have never undergone the ministrations of a Maroon Book edit, I cannot
say whether, in practice, its suggestions have ossified into rules.
27 Really should see, but at least pretend to have seen, e.g., M. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977); Form and Substance, supra note 25;
Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711 (1980).
28 Lushing, supra note 22, at 600 (quoting Bluebook, at iv (10th ed. 1958)).
29 Trust me, I've looked it up.
30 Maroon Book, supra note 18, at 7.
31 See, e.g., Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 297 (1987).
32 Examples deleted to protect the innocent-and the powerful.
33 See, randomly, [vol.] Any L. Rev. [page], n.[footnote] (date).
34 M. Price, A Practical Manual of Standard Legal Citations iii (2d ed. 1958), quoted in
Cooper, supra note 12, at 3.
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research materials."35 Some advocates of the citation footnote describe its
value as follows: "[T]o one digging into the bowels of the law, a fat footnote
is a mother lode, a vein of purest gold." 6 In a somewhat more cynical vein,
we should remember Fred Rodell's assertion: "Every legal writer is pre-
sumed to be a liar until he proves himself otherwise with a flock of
footnotes.",
37
If footnotes are indeed intended to serve this bibliographic function, then
we should desire accurate signals, indicating precisely the relationship
between the statement in the text and the contents of the cited materials. In
that case, the Bluebook, at least in theory, is more useful. In reality, how-
ever, anyone who has ever struggled-or, worse yet, fought with an editor-
over the often metaphysical distinctions between, for example, "[no signal]"
and "see" or "but see" and "but cf." feels fully prepared to dispute just how
many angels can dance on the head of a pin."8
Furthermore, whatever (false?) sense of precision the prescriptions of the
Bluebook may provide, they depend for their usefulness on consistency
across space and time. Unfortunately, temporal consistency is lacking, for
the array of available signals and their prescribed meaning has changed
between various editions of the Bluebook. As one commentator points
out,
39 in the twelfth edition, "see also" referred to authority that "provides
background to a question analogous to that examined in text."''4  By the
thirteenth edition, the meaning had changed to "constitutes additional
source material that supports the proposition."'4 ' Thus, a researcher seeking
35 Slomanson, Footnote Logic in Law Review Writing: Previously Unaddressed in the
Criminal Justice System, 9 Crim. Just. J. 65, 68 (1986).
36 Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 915, 919 (1953), quoted in
Martin, supra note 8, at 1097. One shudders to think of the result of subjecting this metaphor
to Jack Balkin's deconstructive zeal. See Balkin, supra note 3.
37 Rodell, supra note 1, at 41.
38 In a face-off between the editors of the Maroon Book and the Bluebook, the former
focused on introductory signals; the latter used no signals. Law Review Conference, supra
note 16.
For a somewhat cynical translation of the meaning of the various Bluebook signals, see
Lushing, supra note 22, at 601:
Use no signal when you've got the guts. Use e.g. when there are other examples you are
too lazy to find or are skeptical of unearthing. Use accord when one court has cribbed
from the other's opinion. Use see when the case is on all three's. Use cf. when you've
wasted your time reading the case. Insert but in front of these last two when a frown
instead of a smile is indicated.
39 Kanter, Putting Your Best Footnote Forward, Barrister, Spring 1982, at 42, 52.
40 Bluebook, supra note 4, at 7 (12th ed. 1976), quoted in Kanter, supra note 39, at 52.
41 Bluebook, supra note 4, at 8 (13th ed. 1981), quoted in Kanter, supra note 39, at 52. A
category presumably separable from "authority [that] directly supports the proposition,"
which should be introduced by "see." Authors, of course, have a vested interest in arguing for
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to comprehend the precise meaning of a source introduced by the signal "see
also" presumably must compare the date of publication of the article within
which the citation appears to the date of publication of the thirteenth edition
of the Bluebook.
Such transcendental nonsense may be merely academic when source and
citation are themselves academic productions. When the citation is in a judi-
cial opinion, however, Court III may need to divine the meaning Court II
meant to attribute to an opinion of Court I by parsing the introductory sig-
nal used by Court I.42 Were Court II, however, to have shifted to the
Maroon Book, wherein citations may be introduced by any descriptive lan-
guage that "explain[s] its force and or [sic] purpose,"'43 Court III would be
freer to reinterpret the precedents of Courts I and II.
All the above assumed that the function of footnotes was to support the
text and thus that the function of signals was to indicate the relationship
between statements made in the text and statements made in, or implied by,
the cited materials. In fact, however, this is only one of the purposes served
by citation footnotes.'
Footnotes frequently serve to indicate a relationship, not merely between
texts, but between the author of the article and the authors of the cited
materials. This sort of strategic footnoting has two forms. An established
author, seeking to make a lateral move into a related field, may erect a bat-
tlement of footnotes. A controversial statement is followed by a lengthy
note referring the reader generally to writings by the recognized authorities
in the new field.45 A less-established author, especially in a tenure article,
may cite to as many as possible of the extant writings by established legal
scholars. Such footnotes indicate one's grasp of the literature. They also
enhance the possibility that an outside reviewer will happily find her own
"see" and thus avoiding further dispute over the content of "see also's" "encouraged"
parenthetical. Bluebook, supra note 4, at 9.
42 Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 938 n.14 (1984) (holding that
Supreme Court citation of earlier Judge Wright concurrence, introduced by a cf., was an
endorsement since the Bluebook calls for the use of cf. only for a source "sufficiently analogous
to lend support"); see also Book Note, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 199, 200 & nn.8-12 (1987)
(citing other instances where the Bluebook was used as authority in deciding legal questions).
43 Maroon Book, supra note 18, at 12.
44 Textual footnotes (such as this one) are outside the scope of this Book Review. I note,
however, that they, too, have multiple meanings and purposes. For example, my colleague,
George Mundstock, says that footnotes are the place in which he responds to those critical
voices that emerge from his subconscious as he writes the text. This may explain why "id."
appears only in the footnotes of law review articles. But see Lawrence, The Id, The Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
45 See, e.g., R. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 40 n.18 (1988)
(literature on Hamlet).
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work cited.46 Unlike the situation in Meiklejohn's town meeting, it often
appears that it is at least as important that the appropriate people be cited as
that the appropriate statements be supported.47
Previous writers occasionally have alluded to the hidden purposes of cita-
tions or the ways in which the demands of editors (or future tenure commit-
tees) have influenced the forms of law review writing. Professor Rotunda
noted with amused disdain that "any unread article may still be cited."4
On a far more serious note, Professor Delgado criticized the closed, self-
referential circle of white male scholars, published in the leading law
reviews, who wrote about minorities but failed to cite to works by minority
scholars.49
Once we recognize the multiple purposes served by the decision to cite to
particular sources, the inadequacy of the range of introductory signals in the
Bluebook becomes readily apparent. Hereby is my modest proposal-an
alternative to the Bluebook and/or a supplement to the Maroon Book-of
useful introductory signals.
1. Will not see in: Many authors have said something along the order of
"no court has ever recognized the relationship between X and Y," and then
faced an editor's demand for support for the proposition. One could try
"See, e.g., 452 F. Supp. 761," or any other randomly chosen reporter page.50
Alternatively, one could simply say "See, e.g., -.5 Will not see in or Will
not see in, e.g., provide a more explicit alternative.52 If desired, an assertive
46 A footnote here would be vulgar.
47 A. Meildejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 25 (1948) (asserting
that what is important for free speech is not that everyone gets to speak but that everything
worth saying be said). Anyone who has attended faculty meetings will recognize that the latter
is a tiny subset of the former.
48 Rotunda, Law Reviews-The Extreme Centrist Position, 62 Ind. L.J. 1, 3 n.7 (1986).
49 Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132
U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984); see also Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge:
Planting Seeds in Plowed-up Ground, 11 Harv. Women's L.L 1 (1988) ("One can discern the
landscape of segregated legal knowledge by reading the law reviews of elite law schools.").
These Reflections appear to have had reflections of their own, in a hall of (distorting) mirrors.
See Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989)
(challenging, inter alia, the claim that the failure of white scholars to cite minority scholarship
is an indication of racism). But don't you wish you could see/hear R. Delgado & K.
Crenshaw, Remarks at Emerging Voices Conference (Sept. 1989).
50 Strasser, supra note 10, at 507 n.2 ("See, e.g., The N.Y. Times").
51 Don't Cry, supra note 10, at 1554 n.5.
52 The related signal, do not see, e.g., [this is not a signal; cf. Magritte] may also have other
uses. Fred Schauer has suggested that it might have served as a still more ironically self-
deprecating introductory signal in Schauer, Constitutional Conventions (Book Review), 87
Mich. L. Rev. 1407, 1410 n.1 (1989) (following textual reference to treatises of Blackstone,
Story, Corbin, Prosser, Loss, etc. with footnoted "See also??? F. Schauer, The Law of
Obscenity (1976).").
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variant signal could be Trust me, I've looked for it.
2. See, e.g., [future volume] F.2d [future page]: When the author has pro-
posed a solution for the relationship between X and Y, she may well expect
it to be adopted by the courts. This signal indicates that expected outcome.
A variant for the more self-assured would be see, e.g., 111 S. Ct. 1; for the
more academically ambitious, consider the variation see, e.g., 77 Va. L. Rev.
1.53
3. See, sort of: This is the signal for the citation that the editor probably
insisted on, but which only the most extraordinarily compulsive reader
would examine. The more honest signal would be "The law review editors
made me cite to.... " Innumerable examples could be cited; the kindest are
the pair of references to the Oxford English Dictionary in the first University
of Pennsylvania Law Review Aside.54 Again, variant signals are available:
see if you must or trust me, I've looked it up. An author with enough clout
might bludgeon the editors into allowing the footnote I'm the expert; no one
worth citing would dare contradict me.
4. See, randomly: This is the proposed reference to the uncollected works
of an author who has had a good idea and reworked it throughout his career.
Rather than choose any one exemplar, to which the reader may not have
ready access, cite as follows: See, randomly, Smith, Law Reviews (19xx-
19yy). This signal might be viewed as the collective equivalent of passim.
5. Really should see: Once we recognize that not every positive Bluebook
signal is an endorsement by the author, we can understand the need for a
signal like this.55 A more forceful variation, especially for the nonstandard
source, might be: she's gotta see it! When the message is that the source isn't
directly on point to the topic of the article, but you really loved it and want
your readers to share the excitement, the appropriate signal might be see, for
the hell of it.
6. Pretend to have seen: In every field there are the classic works that one
would read if the time ever magically appeared but that, in the meantime,
cannot be ignored if one is to appear scholarly.5 6 To cite them, but with this
53 Thanks to the miracles of modem word-processing, no one will ever know if this
illustrious law review was the stated standard of excellence before its editors graciously
accepted this Book Review.
54 Don't Fly, supra note 10, at 1474 nn.1 & 4.
55 This signal would have saved some print for Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27
Ariz. L. Rev. 317, 318 n.l (1985) ("I would advise those few of you who may be interested in
learning more about Fred Rodell to .... ").
56 The sources that properly fall within this signal are, of course, culturally contingent. Cf.
Regina v. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287 (1884) ("[i]t would be a very easy and cheap display of
commonplace learning to quote from Greek and Latin authors, from Horace, from Juvenal,
from Cicero, from Euripides"). (You didn't really expect a list of examples, did you?)
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signal, is to evoke the attitude of the English landed gentry, whose tradition
was to live well, but not to pay the bills.
If one wishes to become quite subtle and convoluted, one might have a
variant signal (perhaps act as though you have seen) for still more obscure
sources that the people you pretend to have seen would have pretended to
have seen.
7. Don't you wish you could see: How often have you seen a cite to a work,
sometimes by a famous person, frequently with an intriguing title, followed
by the parentheticals (unpublished manuscript) (on file at the X Law
Review)? Signals like see or see also are a cruel joke: if you were meant to
see it, you would have been in the inner circle to whom the manuscript was
distributed. Often, only the signal suggested here filly expresses the
author's relationship with the source (and the reader).57
The addition of these new signals to the available vocabulary is not, of
course, an unmitigated good. Sometimes, standard signals like "see" or "see
also" can be useful for what they do not say. An author may, for example,
be unsure if a cited work deserves a "really see" cite, or she may consider it
impolitic to indicate publicly, via a "see, sort of" cite, its marginal value. In
such cases, the standard citation forms have the virtue of using linguistic
ambiguity to avoid confronting delicate theoretical or political issues.58
The prior discussion is largely nonsense, but it is not, I hope, the transcen-
dental nonsense criticized long ago by Felix Cohen.59 It is, rather, a form of
immanent nonsense, playing upon feelings we have all had about the enter-
prise in which we are engaged. As my colleague, Robert Rosen, pointed out,
57 One presumably self-mocking example is in Book Note, supra note 10, at 1328 n.19 ("see
conversations with the Executive Editors of the Harvard Law Review (March 5, 1987; October
7, 1987; March 1, 1988)"). Cites to conversations can be seen as thoughtful acknowledgments
of the contributions of others or as strategic positioning, depending on the relative status of
writer and conversant. See Austin, supra note 15, at nn.78-80.
Professor Frances Olsen's book review of Catharine MacKinnnon's Feminism Unmodified
(1987) presents another vivid example of a citation that defines a closed community of scholars
from which the reader is excluded. Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style (Book Review), 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1147, 1176 n.117 (1989) (noting that the editor of Olsen's piece in the Texas
Law Review suggested by way of a comment on a galley proof that "a statement about nooks
and crannies might be the only thing people would quote from the article and that the force of
[the] critique would be lost").
If there are any such unpublished manuscript cites in my prior works, I hereby renounce
them. Cf. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 25 (on renouncing).
A distinct genre is the cite to the not-yet-published manuscript, often the result of
collegiality among those working concurrently on related topics. It is essential to remember to
change the footnote from the working draft version (forthcoming Hotshot L. Rev.).
58 See U.S.C. passim.
59 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809
(1935).
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the signals provided us by the Bluebook fail to capture the range of
responses we have to the sources we cite. Perhaps one more new signal is
needed to do so.'
60 Feel, e.g., Rodell, supra note 1 or Balkin, supra note 3. My response to each of these is
complex, textured and emotive. It is an imagined relation with the author as well as the text
and involves far more than the abstract, visualized connection evoked by the term "see." See
and feel, generally, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1099 (1990).
